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Marcel Stoetzler
Durkheim’s and Simmel’s reactions to antisemitism and their
reflection in their views on modern society
If one ever asked oneself what sociology is all about, one could do worse than
consulting Auguste Comte’s 1822 manifesto, Prospectus des travaux scientifiques
n8cessaires pour r8organiser la societ8, the Plan of the Scientific Works Necessary
for the Reorganization of Society.1 It sketches out the historical-structural task
that the new discipline, whose name Comte later popularized, was supposed to
fulfil, namely to end-but-preserve—as the Germans would say, aufzuheben—the
Revolution: safeguard its achievements from reaction as well as from further
revolutions. Sociology would do so by separating the good bits of modernity
from the bad bits. The former Comte saw as grounded in a secular, macro-
historical trend of European history and civilization, the latter in the undis-
ciplined hubris of troublemakers led astray by metaphysical nonsense peddled
by the Enlightenment, or more precisely, by the non-positivistic strand of the
Enlightenment. Sociology would study and understand the laws of history and
silence the metaphysical troublemakers.
Sociology’s commitment to making that messy thing called society safe for
modernity (the industrial-capitalist world system of nation states constituted
and populated by modern individuals) remained tricky. Spanners were thrown
into the machinery left, right, and centre by people who were not so positive
about the positive state of society. Rather ironically, most of those who continued
and developed the Comtean project of sociology did so by basing it on some of
those ghastly metaphysical ideas from the Enlightenment, notably those of
Immanuel Kant. Sociology, at least in France and Germany, emerged mostly as a
set of differing blends of positivism and Kantian, or neo-Kantian, idealism. Even
more ironic, though, is the fact that there were some admirers and followers of at
least some aspects of Comte’s philosophy who were rather hostile to the pro-
gressivist, more liberal project into which positivism as sociology had morphed
1 Auguste Comte, Plan of the Scientific Work Necessary for the Reorganization of Society, in:
Idem, Early Political Writings (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought), Cam-
bridge 1998, p. 47–144.
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY 4.0
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen
ISBN Print: 9783847109778 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737009775
in the course of the nineteenth century : these figures, including the proto-fascist
Charles Maurras and the more mainstream Ferdinand BrunetiHre, an intellectual
cheerleader of the anti-Dreyfusards who was at the receiving end of a most
famous polemic by the leading Dreyfusard Emile Durkheim.2 Those who shaped
the new discipline that Comte had postulated were very much at odds with those
anti-liberal Comteans in questions concerning the nature and desirability of
modernity. This constellation illustrates the more general point that philo-
sophical and social-theoretical ideas about modernity tend to cut across political
divides, and this element of ambiguity must be central to studying them, at least
for those who study with a political mind.
The new social order that emerged in the period following the French Revo-
lution was subjected to forms of critique that were (explicitly or implicitly)
affirmative of its modern, Enlightenment premises while pointing to their in-
sufficient actualization, and others, sometimes dubbed the ‘critique of civi-
lization’, or ‘cultural critique’—Kulturkritik—that challenged, or claimed to
challenge, these premises themselves.3 In empirical reality there is no clear de-
marcation between these two registers of critique, and one could probably de-
scribe any modern manifestation of critique as being primarily one of these but
at the same time, to a smaller or larger extent, also the other. Sociology, in
keeping with Comte’s original vision of it, is first of all pitted against the Kul-
turkritik that it had to do battle with, while both were in turn challenged by
Marxism.4 To what extent sociology, the science of post-Revolutionary societal
consolidation, was, and arguably is, also a bit like its own and the Revolution’s
enemies, is the question I try to address in this chapter.
For historical reasons that have little to do with Jews, the enemies of the
civilization that according to Comte had just entered its positive state often
2 Michael Sutton, Nationalism, Positivism and Catholicism. The Politics of Charles Maurras and
French Catholics 1890–1914 (Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics),
Cambridge 1982; Olivier Dard, Charles Maurras. Le ma%tre et l’action (Nouvelles biographies
historiques), Paris 2013.
3 On the concept of Kulturkritik see Georg Bollenbeck, Eine Geschichte der Kulturkritik. Von
Rousseau bis Günther Anders, Munich 2007; Rita Aldenhoff, Kapitalismusanalyse und Kul-
turkritik. Bürgerliche Nationalökonomen entdecken Karl Marx, in: Gangolf Hübinger/Wolf-
gang J. Mommsen (ed.), Intellektuelle im Deutschen Kaiserreich, Frankfurt a. M. 1993,
p. 78–94, 218–222; Ludger Heidebrink, Der Kampf des Bürgers gegen sich selbst. Antinomien
moderner Kulturkritik, in: Bernd Wirkus (ed.), Die kulturelle Moderne zwischen Demokratie
und Diktatur. Die Weimarer Republik und danach, Konstanz 2007, p. 153–175; Johannes
Heinssen, Historismus und Kulturkritik. Studien zur deutschen Geschichtskultur im späten
19. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2003.
4 The sociologists tended to reject Marxism as either a form of über-metaphysical magic
thinking, as for example Simmel did who understood it as a form of Hegelianism, or, to the
contrary, as a kind of über-utilitarianism corrosive of society, as most others did. Both are
partially correct perceptions of the Marxism of the time.
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thought of it as being somehow Jewish. The rejection of, or resentment against,
post-Enlightenment modern civilization took therefore often the form of anti-
semitism. In Germany and France in the period of the formation of classical
sociology two key events in the history of antisemitism in particular stood out in
occupying the minds of intellectuals including those who were engaged in the
process of theorizing modern society, the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute of 1879 to
1881 in which notables of German national liberalism reacted to the emergence
of organized forms of political antisemitism,5 and, on a much larger, truly na-
tional scale, the Dreyfus affair in France from 1894 to 1906, whose most widely
discussed phase began in 1898 when leading intellectuals reacted to the captain’s
sentencing.6
The Berlin Antisemitism Dispute centred on Heinrich von Treitschke’s ex-
pressions of support for the antisemitic movement whose critics included Moritz
Lazarus, an important figure in the development of the social sciences in Ger-
many and a major influence on Georg Simmel,7 and liberal notables like Max
Weber’s father Max Weber Sr. Treitschke’s lectures were large events that many
Berlin students with an interest in society, politics and history would have at-
tended. It seems safe to assume that no one in the milieu out of which classical
sociology emerged in Germany could have been unaware of the dispute on
antisemitism, and yet the canonical texts contain practically nothing on it. The
case is somewhat different in France where the (in retrospect) undisputed father
figure of the discipline, Emile Durkheim, was not only practically and crucially
involved in the battle against the antisemitic attack on the republic but inter-
vened very publicly with one of his best-known essays into the affair, “L’in-
dividualisme et les intellectuels”, ‘Individualism and the Intellectuals’, em-
5 Marcel Stoetzler, Cultural Difference in the National State. From Trouser-Selling Jews to Un-
bridled Multiculturalism, in: Patterns of Prejudice 42/3 (2008), p. 245–279; Marcel Stoetzler,
The State, the Nation, and the Jews. Liberalism and the Antisemitism Dispute in Bismarck’s
Germany, Lincoln, London 2008.
6 Stephen Wilson, Ideology and Experience. Antisemitism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus
Affair (The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization), Rutherford 1982; Chad Alan Goldberg,
Introduction to Emile Durkheim’s “Anti-Semitism and Social Crisis,” in: Sociological Theory
26,4 (2008), p. 299–321; Idem, The Jews, the Revolution, and the Old Regime in French Anti-
Semitism and Durkheim’s Sociology, in: Sociological Theory 29,4 (2011), p. 248–271; Pierre
Birnbaum, The Anti-Semitic Moment: A Tour of France in 1898. Translated by Jane Marie
Todd, New York 2003; Steven Englund, Illusionary Violence: Another Look at the French
Antisemitic “Riots” of 1898, in: Stefanie Schüler-Springorum/Michael Kohlstruck/Ulrich
Wyrwa (ed.), Bilder kollektiver Gewalt – Kollektive Gewalt im Bild: Annäherungen an eine
Ikonographie der Gewalt. Für Werner Bergmann zum 65. Geburtstag, Berlin 2015, S. 219–228.
7 Marcel Stoetzler, Moritz Lazarus und die liberale Kritik an Heinrich von Treitschkes liberalem
Antisemitismus; in: Hans-Joachim Hahn/Olaf Kistenmacher (ed.), Beschreibungsversuche
der Judenfeindschaft (Europäisch-jüdische Studien. Beiträge, 20), Berlin/Boston 2014,
p. 98–120; Mathias Berek, Neglected German-Jewish Visions for a Pluralistic Society : Moritz
Lazarus, in: Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 60 (2015), p. 45–59.
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ploying key aspects of his sociology in hands-on combat.8 It is important to note,
though, that even this key text in the struggle with antisemitism does not even
mention either Jews or antisemitism but discusses and defends one of the cat-
egories that reactionary, antisemitic Kulturkritik attacked: modern individua-
lism.
From the perspective of a history of sociological responses to antisemitism,
the most obvious German counterpart to Durkheim’s L’individualisme et les
intellectuels would be Lazarus’ 1880 anti-antisemitic intervention, Was heißt
national?, ‘What does national mean?’9 In this chapter I will explore a less
obvious cross-border (non-)connection that is closer in terms of its con-
temporaneity : I will try to bring Durkheim’s 1898 text into a dialogue with a
lecture by Lazarus’ much better known student, Georg Simmel, from 1896, Das
Geld in der modernen Cultur, ‘Money in Modern Culture’10, that contains key
ideas of his later monograph, the Philosophy of Money.11 This text does not
explicitly contain anything on antisemitism, either, but I would like to suggest
that these sociological classics can be read as responses to the type of reactionary
critique of modern civilization that underlies the antisemitism of for example the
anti-Dreyfusards and their counterparts in Germany.
Talking about Durkheim and Simmel in the same breath is rather tempting
also because they lived such parallel lives. Both were born in 1858, although at
very different places: Durkheim in the provincial town of Epinal in the Vosges,
Simmel in Berlin. Durkheim was the son of a rabbi and abandoned his own initial
plan to study for the rabbinate in favour of philosophy. Simmel was a Protestant
of Jewish family background and also was primarily trained in philosophy ; his
father was an industrialist. Both died quite young in 1917 and 1918 respectively.
Both were Kantians of sorts, although Durkheim was also influenced by Comte,
Simmel, very different, by Bergson. Durkheim’s principal objective was to de-
velop a ‘science of morality’ adequate to the society of the Third Republic to
8 Emile Durkheim, L’individualisme et les intellectuels, in: Emile Durkheim: La Science So-
ciale et L’Action (Le sociologue, 18), Paris 1970, p. 261–278; Idem, Individualism and the
Intellectuals, in: Steven Lukes, Durkheim’s ‘Individualism and the Intellectuals’, in: Political
Studies 18 (1969), p. 14–30, here p. 19–30; Emile Durkheim, Individualism and the In-
tellectuals, in: Robert N. Bellah (ed.), Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society. Selected
Writings (The Heritage of Sociology), Chicago 1973, p. 43–57.
9 Stoetzler, The State, the Nation, and the Jews (see note 5); Stoetzler, Moritz Lazarus (see note
7); Berek, Neglected German-Jewish Visions (see note 7).
10 Georg Simmel, Das Geld in der modernen Kultur, in: Heinz-Jürgen Dahme/David P. Frisby
(ed.), Georg Simmel. Aufsätze und Abhandlungen 1894–1900 (Gesamtausgabe, 5), Frankfurt
a. M. 1992, p. 178–196; Georg Simmel, Money in Modern Culture, in: David Frisby/Mike
Featherstone (ed.), Simmel on Culture. Selected Writings (Theory, Culture & Society),
London 1997, p. 243–255.
11 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, ed. by David Frisby, translated by David Frisby and
Tom Bottomore, London 32004.
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which the ‘science of social facts’ was to provide crucial fundaments and support.
One formative influence in Durkheim’s intellectual development was a visit to
Germany in 1885/6 (after he had already written several reviews of works by
German sociologists) that resulted in his long essay on La science positive de la
morale en Allemagne.12 In this essay he discussed positively the historism of
Gustav Schmoller and praised Adolph Wagner’s ‘organic’ concept of society. The
fact that Wagner was a leading antisemite Durkheim either failed to pick up at
this point, or must have found irrelevant. In spite of his own (comparatively
mild) antisemitic tendencies,13 Schmoller was an early supporter of Simmel’s
career : Simmel studied in the environment that the young Durkheim found
rather attractive. In 1889 Simmel gave a talk on The Psychology of Money, which
later fed into “Money in Modern Culture”, in Schmoller’s seminar on political
economy. Simmel’s early development was shaped decisively by Moritz Lazarus,
a pioneer of what is now cultural anthropology, which was also an emerging
interest of Durkheim. From Lazarus, Simmel learned what Adorno later recog-
nized as his most important contribution, the “return of philosophy” to concrete
subjects, things, rather than systemic speculation.14 Lazarus had been a crucial
figure in the Berlin Jewish community and, not unlike Durkheim, a ‘community
spokesman’ and organizer of the struggle against antisemitism. Durkheim and
Simmel were in 1896 and 1898 respectively at pivotal points in their careers: each
had published several well-respected books, and they were both in the process of
re-focusing their attention in preparation of what would emerge as their ‘later’,
and perhaps most influential, works. Moreover, both saw each other as close
allies in the project of forming “une sociologie vraiment scientifique”15, and
Simmel had contributed, following Durkheim’s invitation, one of the two pro-
grammatic articles in the first issue of Ann8e sociologique in 1898 whose editorial
board he was a member of. Simmel was removed, though, from the editorial
board after the first issue due to Durkheim’s disapproval of passages in Simmel’s
manuscript that concerned two subjects, Zionism and the concept of honour—
passages which Durkheim cut without Simmel’s agreement. Firstly, Durkheim
did not welcome any mentioning of Zionism in the journal as he feared due to his
own Jewishness he would automatically be perceived as a supporter of it. Sec-
12 Emile Durkheim, La science positive de la morale en Allemagne, in: Revue Philosophique 24
(1887), p. 33–284; Robert Alun Jones, The Positive Science of Ethics in France. German
Influences on De la division du travail social, in: Sociological Forum 9/1 (1994), p. 37–57.
13 Erik Grimmer-Solem, “Every True Friend of the Fatherland.” Gustav Schmoller and the
“Jewish Question” 1916–1917, in: Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 52/1 (2007), p. 149–163.
14 Theodor W. Adorno, Henkel, Krug und frühe Erfahrung, in: Rolf Tiedemann (Hg.), Theodor
Adorno. Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 11: Noten zur Literatur, Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 556–566.
15 Ottheim Rammstedt, Das Durkheim-Simmelsche Projekt einer “rein wissenschaftlichen
Soziologie” im Schatten der Dreyfus-Affäre, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 26/6 (1997), p. 444.
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ondly, Simmel provided a ‘formal’ analysis of honour as an entirely socially
constituted, content-wise nearly arbitrary means by which social circles main-
tain their exclusivity, and it seems Durkheim feared this—very typically Sim-
melian—‘formal-sociological’ analysis could undermine the Dreyfusard defence
of the captain’s honour. Although arguably Simmel’s position is not in-
compatible with Durkheim’s in theory, in the specific circumstances Durkheim
as editor preferred to provoke Simmel’s departure: la sociologie vraiment sci-
entifique had to take a back seat when there was reason to fear it might interfere
with pressing political necessities. Nevertheless, Durkheim and Simmel con-
tinued to communicate as friends and colleagues, and in particular Simmel’s
work on the sociology of religion was of great influence on Durkheim’s later Les
formes 8l8mentaires de la vie religieuse.16
Individualism and the Intellectuals was Durkheim’s intervention in the
Dreyfus affair in the period immediately following Emile Zola’s famous piece
J’accuse in early 1898 when ‘the affair’ took on increasingly broader dimensions
and more general relevancy as an exemplary instance of the struggle over the
right-wing assault on the modern, secular French republic. This is probably the
one text that comes closest to being an explicit engagement with antisemitism
from within the canon of classical, pre-WW1 sociology.17
Like On the Psychology of Money of 1889, Simmel’s “Money in Modern Cul-
ture” of 1896 was an important step in the process of his developing the key ideas
in his landmark “Philosophy of Money” of 1900. Although Simmel was—very
different in this respect to Durkheim—decidedly and deliberately ‘unpolitical’,
my proposition in this chapter is that Simmel’s text can be read as much as
Durkheim’s as a refutation of antisemitic reasoning—although there are no
grounds to argue that Simmel ‘intended’ it to be such—and that it provides an at
16 Rammstedt, Durkheim-Simmelsche Projekt (see note 15), p. 448.
17 See also Durkheim’s short text Anti-Semitism and Social Crisis. Emile Durkheim, Anti-
Semitism and Social Crisis. Translated by Chad Alan Goldberg, in: Sociological Theory 26/4
(2008), p. 321–323. This is not a developed theoretical text but a short occasional piece.
Nevertheless, it clearly indicates a ‘Durkheimian’ theoretical perspective on antisemitism.
Durkheim chooses a national frame of interpretation, opposing German and Russian anti-
semitisms which are “chronic,” “traditional,” and “aristocratic” to French antisemitism
which “constitutes an acute crisis, due to passing circumstances” (Durkheim, Anti-Semitism
and Social Crisis, p. 322). In France, it is the “superficial symptom of a state of social
malaise”: “when society suffers, it needs someone to blame,” and it “naturally” uses “pa-
riahs” “whom opinion already disfavors” as “expiatory victims.” Durkheim adds that “se-
condary circumstances may have played a role,” including “certain failings of the Jewish
race.” These are not in fact causes, though, as they are “compensated by incontestable
virtues,” and anyway, “the Jews lose their ethnic character with extreme rapidity.” The issue is
a “serious moral disturbance” that cannot be eradicated in the short term, but the govern-
ment can remind the public of its morality by “repress[ing] severely all incitement to hatred”
and by “enlightening the masses” (Durkheim, Anti-Semitism and Social Crisis, p. 323).
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least equally confident defense of modern, liberal civilization to Durkheim’s,
while also sharing some of its ambiguities.
Durkheim’s Individualism and the intellectuals
Durkheim’s Individualism and the Intellectuals was a response to the article
AprHs le ProcHs by Ferdinand BrunetiHre,18 a highly regarded literary critic and
anti-Dreyfusard, that in turn had been a reaction to Zola’s J’accuse and the
Manifesto of the intellectuals organized around the same time by a group of
scholars and writers.19 BrunetiHre’s article had made the points that at least ‘some
Jews’ contributed to the emergence of antisemitism through the dominant role
they allegedly played in French society and that the army was a keystone of social
cohesion and national unity, and not as Herbert Spencer had it an anachronistic
survival of barbarism in the age of industry and commerce. It culminated in a
polemic against pompous intellectuals who spread individualism and anarchy,
undermining the authority of army and state. BrunetiHre was a philosophical
rationalist who had been seen as an exponent of the positivistic tendency in
literary criticism, treating literary history as an evolutionary process,20 and was
famous for his attacks on what he saw as Zola’s ‘scientific materialism’. He had
already been the focus of a momentous debate when he denounced in an article of
1895 the materialistic spirit of modern science,21 advocating the alignment of
science with religion. Around this time he had become an admirer of Pope Leo
XIII whose Thomism and accommodationist approach to the modern world
—such as in the 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum—must have helped make the
notion of a synthesis of Comtean positivism and Catholicism that was then
common on the French right more plausible. BrunetiHre’s position resonates
with Comte’s own attacks on individualism, although in Comte’s case these had
been part of an anti-Protestant, rather than an anti-Jewish agenda.
Durkheim’s rejoinder to BrunetiHre is written in the spirit of what I suggest
was the alternative synthesis of positivism with Kantian idealism. At the level of
the intended meaning, it is obvious that Durkheim argued against clericalism
and in defence of the republic’s professed commitment to ‘the ideas of 1789’,
whose Aufhebung—realization-cum-overcoming—positivism aimed to be. A
reader who looks for the ambivalences, contradictions and fissures in the text
18 Ferdinand BrunetiHre, AprHs le ProcHs, in: Revue des Deux Mondes 146 (1898), p. 428–446.
19 Steven Lukes, Durkheim’s ‘Individualism and the Intellectuals’, in: Political Studies 18 (1969),
p. 14–30.
20 Elton Hocking, Ferdinand BrunetiHre. The Evolution of a Critic (University of Wisconsin
Studies in Language and Literature, 36), Madison 1936, p. 6, 37.
21 Hocking, BrunetiHre (see note 20), p. 6.
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will find most interesting, though, to what extent the overlap between the two
perspectives produces ambiguities in Durkheim’s position that mirror those in
BrunetiHre’s. To put it bluntly, the question is, how ‘conservative’ is Durkheim’s
republicanism, and how ‘liberal’ is BrunetiHre’s antisemitism? It is evident that
not only ‘individualism’ but also ‘positivism’ mean in this context different
things to different people. Durkheim’s effort in this text to clarify his under-
standing of the concept of ‘individualism’ arguably resulted from his own
awareness of the ambiguities involved.
Durkheim states that the contributions by Zola and BrunetiHre have shifted
the debate from one of facts about Dreyfus to one of ‘principle’ and then picks
one of the issues addressed by BrunetiHre: the relationship between in-
dividualism and the nation. He eloquently bypasses the issue that lies at an
intermediate level between a discussion of facts and one of principles, namely the
antisemitic character of the Dreyfus affair, which BrunetiHre had discussed in the
first of three sections of his AprHs le ProcHs. Durkheim implies therewith that he
understands the rejection of the individualism of ‘the intellectuals’ who are said
to be arrogant enough to question the reasoning of state and military hierarchy to
be at the heart of the antisemitism of the anti-Dreyfusards. He responds to the
denunciation of the ‘intellectuals’ and their individualism as hostile to state and
nation by turning the accusation on the accuser : not individualism but those
who denounce it are anti-national. To this purpose he constructs a concept of
individualism that is, in the methodological sense of the term, non-in-
dividualistic: not only is individualism, like any other social fact, constituted by
society, but it is also, for France at least, the decisive social fact that makes the
national society cohere.
Durkheim presents his principal argument right at the beginning of the text,
after the two introductory paragraphs: “a first ambiguity,” “une premiHre
8quivoque,” needs to be cleared up before all else:
“In order to prosecute individualism more easily, it has been confused with the narrow
utilitarianism and the utilitarian egoism of Spencer and the economists. […] It is
indeed an easy game to denounce as an ideal without grandeur this mean commer-
cialism which reduces society to nothing more than a vast apparatus of production and
exchange, and it is exceedingly clear that all social life would be impossible if there did
not exist interests superior to the interests of the individuals. Nothing is more deserved
than that such doctrines are treated as anarchistic, and we can shake hands on this
issue.”22
22 “Pour faire plus facilement le procHs de l’individualisme, on le confond avec l’utilitarisme
8troit et l’8go"sme utilitaire de Spencer et des 8conomistes. […] On a beau jeu, en effet, /
d8noncer comme un id8al sans grandeur ce commercialisme mesquin qui r8duit la soci8t8 /
n’Þtre qu’un vaste appareil de production et d’8change, et il est trop clair que toute vie
commune est impossible s’il n’existe pas d’int8rÞts sup8rieurs aux int8rÞts individuels. Que
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The handshake offered by Durkheim is underwritten by the shared Comtean
anti-individualism that Durkheim modifies through his conception of a quasi-
solidaristic form of, as it were, politically correct individualism that has gone
through a Kantian-idealist reformulation. Durkheim goes on to argue that the
anti-Dreyfusards attack the anarchistic-economistic-Spencerian concept of in-
dividualism in bad faith: they must know that it is an irrelevancy not even held
by many economists anymore. Durkheim probably had in mind here the Ka-
theder-socialists of the ‘historical school’ around Schmoller whose historicist
rejection of rationalism he had applauded earlier.23 Durkheim argues that the
anti-Dreyfusards really attack what he proposes is the actual individualism
prevalent in the French Republic which is idealist rather than utilitarian. Durk-
heim adds that their putting raison d’8tat above the inviolable rights of an
individual (such as Dreyfus) to fair legal process is in fact akin to the utilitarian
doctrine of the greatest happiness of the greatest number which likewise fails to
acknowledge the inviolability of individual human rights.
By contrast, the Kantian idealist individualism defended by Durkheim is one
to which a notion of the generically human is sacred:
“Whoever makes an attempt on a man’s life, on a man’s liberty, on a man’s honor,
inspires in us a feeling of horror analogous in every way to that which the believer
experiences when he sees his idol profaned. Such an ethic […] is a religion in which man
is at once the worshipper and the god. […] This religion is individualistic […].”24
Durkheim claims that individualism in this sense is not only ‘a’ sort of religion
but it is ‘the’ religion for the modern period: “Not only is individualism distinct
from anarchy, but it is henceforth the only system of beliefs which can ensure the
moral unity of the country.”25 It is a “truism” that “only a religion can bring about
this harmony.” However, “it is known today that a religion does not necessarily
de semblables doctrines soient trait8es d’anarchiques, rien donc n’est plus m8rit8 et nous y
donnons les mains.” Durkheim, L’individualisme et les intellectuels (see note 8), p. 262;
Durkheim, Individualism and the Intellectuals [Lukes] (see note 8), p. 20; Durkheim, In-
dividualism and the Intellectuals [Bellah] (see note 8), p. 44.
23 A more thorough discussion would need to examine to what extent Spencer himself and the
tradition of classical political economy in fact subscribed to the bogeyman concept of in-
dividualism that BrunetiHre and Durkheim construct.
24 “Quiconque attente / une vie d’homme, / la libert8 d’un homme, / l’honneur d’un homme,
nous inspire un sentiment d’horreur, de tout point analogue / celui qu’8preuve le croyand qui
voit profaner [sic] son idole. Une telle morale […] est une religion dont l’homme est, / la fois,
le fidHle et le Dieu. […] cette religion est individualiste […]”; Durkheim, L’individualisme
(see note 8), p. 265; Durkheim Individualism, Lukes (see note 8), p. 20f; Durkheim, In-
dividualism, Bellah (see note 8), p. 46.
25 “Non seulement l’individualisme n’est pas l’anarchie, mais c’est d8sormais le seul systHme de
croyances qui puisse assurer l’unit8 morale du pays”; Durkheim, L’individualisme (see note
8), p. 270; Durkheim Individualism [Lukes] (see note 8), p. 25; Durkheim, Individualism,
Bellah (see note 8), p. 50.
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imply symbols and rites, properly speaking, or temples and priests”26 : “essen-
tially, it is nothing other than a body of collective beliefs and practices endowed
with a special authority.” This authority results from the fact that “as soon as a
goal is pursued by an entire people, it acquires, in consequence of this unan-
imous adherence, a sort of moral supremacy” and “a religious character.”
Durkheim recuperates therewith the concept of the religious from his opponents,
along with that of the national, arguing that individualism “has penetrated our
institutions and our customs, it has become part of our whole life, […] our entire
moral organization,” that is, it is central to French national culture and society.27
Durkheim writes that “all that societies require in order to hold together is
that their members fix their eyes on the same end and come together in a single
faith.”28 This faith, to Durkheim, is individualism; if some misuse individualism
for egoistic ends, this proves nothing against it.
It is worth noting that Durkheim presupposes in this argument the existence
of ‘a people’ (peuple) that is able unanimously to pursue a shared goal. This
presupposition is reflected in the immediately following statement, introduced
with “from a different angle,” that for “a society” (clearly used here synonymous
with ‘a people’) to be coherent (i. e. , to define and ‘unanimously’ to pursue goals)
there needs to exist “a certain intellectual and moral community.” Durkheim’s
gloss on the ‘truism’ is rather circular : religion (broadly understood) is needed to
warrant moral unity, but religion is also the result of common goal-oriented
action of ‘a people’ that in turn presupposes the moral unity that it is supposed to
warrant. The most stable category in this argument is actually the one that is least
explicated, the ‘people’.
Of religion Durkheim goes on to say that it always changes so that “the religion
of yesterday could not be the religion of tomorrow.” He then asks the question
what new religion can replace the old one which BrunetiHre and others are
artificially trying to resurrect. Durkheim’s argument is here that “the only
possible [religion] can only be the religion of humanity, of which the in-
dividualistic ethic is the rational expression.” Here Durkheim switches from an
idealist-normative argument to a positivistic-factual one: he presents what ac-
tually is a (perfectly valid) liberal, Kantian-idealist normative claim—we ought
26 Durkheim, L’individualisme (see note 8), p. 270f ; Durkheim Individualism, Lukes (see
note 8), p. 25; Durkheim, Individualism, Bellah (see note 8), p. 51.
27 “Il a p8n8tr8 nos institutions et nos mœurs, il est mÞl8 / toute notre vie […] toute notre
organisation morale”; Durkheim, L’individualisme (see note 8), p. 265; Durkheim In-
dividualism [Lukes] (see note 8), p. 22; Durkheim, Individualism [Bellah] (see note 8), p. 46.
28 “[…] tout ce qu’il faut aux soci8t8s pour Þtre coh8rentes, c’est que leurs membres aient les
yeux fix8s sur un mÞme but, se rencontrent dans une mÞme foi […]”; Durkheim, L’in-
dividualisme (see note 8), p. 268; Durkheim Individualism [Lukes] (see note 8), p. 24;
Durkheim, Individualism [Bellah] (see note 8), p. 49.
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to promote individualism as the only form of quasi-religion that modern society
needs—as if it was a conclusion arrived at by way of empirical observation:
individualism positively is the religion of modern society. This move transforms
the normative-idealist demand into a scientific insight in the law-like necessity of
a historical reality that one should not oppose, which is in keeping with the
Comtean conception of what sociology ought to do: understand the laws of
history so as to adapt human agency to them and sail with their winds. Durk-
heim’s argument here is that societies grow and expand, circumstances become
more diverse and more mobile, and hence traditions and social practices need to
“maintain a state of plasticity and instability,” while advanced division of labour
also diversifies the contents of men’s minds: “the members of a single social
group will no longer have anything in common other than their humanity.” The
“idea of the human person (personnne humaine) in general,” although it is
“given different nuances according to the diversity of national temperaments,” is
“therefore the only idea which would survive, unalterable and impersonal, above
the changing tides of particular opinions,”29 and “the sentiments which it
awakens are the only ones to be found in almost all hearts”:
“The communion of spirits can no longer be based on definite rites and prejudices,
since rites and prejudices have been swept away by the course of events. Consequently,
nothing remains which men can love and honor in common if not man himself. That is
how man has become god for man and why he can no longer create other gods without
lying to himself. […] The whole of individualism lies here; and that is what makes it a
necessary doctrine.”30
Durkheim’s argument not only collapses a normative argument into an em-
pirical one—the universalist, liberal normative ideal is posited as if it was a
‘necessary’ social reality anyway—but is also empirically dubious: ‘general
humanity’ is regrettably not at all the only thing modern individuals acknowl-
edge they share with others. Durkheim’s claim that individualism and the ‘re-
ligion of humanity’ by necessity must become the only possible quasi-religion in
the modern context is a nonsequitur, and a normative, not to say rather wishful
thought. His further claim that “if there is one country among all others in which
the individualist cause is truly national, it is our own” is likewise a claim that the
29 Durkheim, L’individualisme (see note 8), p. 271f ; Durkheim Individualism [Lukes] (see
note 8), p. 26; Durkheim, Individualism [Bellah] (see note 8), p. 51f.
30 “La communion des esprits ne peut plus se faire sur des rites et des pr8jug8s d8finis puisque
rites et pr8jug8s sont emport8s par le cours des choses; par suite, il ne reste plus rien que les
hommes puissent aimer et honorer en commun, si ce n’est l’homme lui-mÞme. Voil/ com-
ment l’homme est devenu un dieu pour l’homme et pourquoi il ne peut plus, sans se mentir /
soi-mÞme, se faire d’autres dieux. […] Tout l’individualisme est l/; et c’est l/ ce qui en fait la
doctrine n8cessaire”; Durkheim, L’individualisme (see note 8), p. 272; Durkheim In-
dividualism [Lukes] (see note 8), p. 26; Durkheim, Individualism [Bellah] (see note 8), p. 52.
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Dreyfus affair itself disproved. Durkheim’s key argument that the unfair treat-
ment of Dreyfus constitutes an unpatriotic act rests on rather shaky foundations:
Durkheim fails to give a compelling reason why, as the anti-Dreyfusards believe,
nationalism, antisemitism or Catholicism, or a combination of all these could not
just as well, or even more effectively, fulfil the function of being the ‘religion’
required by modern society. A century and a bit later, with the resurgence of
religious ‘fundamentalisms’ of all sorts that are in practice strongly political
affirmations of religion, it seems not too far-fetched to conclude that quite often
religion is the ‘religion’ of modern society.
Durkheim’s agreement with the anti-Dreyfusards that societal cohesion must
be warranted by some sort of religion would only work as the basis of an anti-
antisemitic argument if he was able to offer robust support for his claim that only
“individualism properly understood” (to use the term Tocqueville coined in a
related context) can be that religion. Durkheim is in breach here of one of his own
justly celebrated methodological premises: just because it is functionally and
logically needed by society, it will not necessarily come about. There is much in
Durkheim’s argument that BrunetiHre and other anti-Dreyfusards could adopt
without needing to come to the anti-antisemitic conclusion that Durkheim
suggests follows from it.
Simmel’s Money in modern culture
Simmel’s 1896 lecture Money in modern culture31 starts from a reflection on
modernity (Neuzeit) in contradistinction to the Middle Ages: while “in the
Middle Ages a human being finds himself in compulsory membership (bind-
ender Zugehörigkeit) of a village (Gemeinde) or an estate, a feudal association or
a corporation,”32 modernity, on the one hand, has given the personality “in-
comparable inner and outer freedom of movement,” on the other it has given
“equally incomparable objectivity” to “the material (sachliche) contents of life”
to the effect that “the things’ own laws (die eigenen Gesetze der Dinge) in-
creasingly assert themselves (gelangen mehr und mehr zur Herrschaft)” as ob-
jective laws—a notion that is not a million miles from Durkheim’s concept of the
faits sociaux. Simmel describes the contradictory effects of “the money econo-
my” that he finds central to the modernization process and plays out its positive
and negative effects against each other, ending on a religious note in a (perhaps
31 Simmel, Das Geld in der modernen Kultur (see note 10), p. 178–196; Simmel, Money in
modern culture (see note 10), p. 243–255.
32 Simmel, Das Geld in der modernen Kultur (see note 10), p. 178; Simmel, Money in modern
culture (see note 10), p. 244.
Marcel Stoetzler94
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY 4.0
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen
ISBN Print: 9783847109778 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737009775
surprising) effort to reconcile the contradictions that his lecture takes account of.
The fact that Simmel puts money rather than, say, ‘division of labour’ or ‘mode of
production’ at the centre of the modernization process puts his argument in
direct competition with the Kulturkritik type of literature of the time, including
many antisemitic tracts, that tend to point to money as the root of all the evils of
modern civilization. Simmel poses the question, here as elsewhere in his work,
how evil money really is. Although there is no evidence that Simmel deliberately
‘intended’ to confront that literature, it seems reasonable to assume that his
choice of focus reflects a certain spirit of the time to the effect that Simmel’s
argument on money and modernity can also be read as an anti-antisemitic
argument, albeit in a more indirect fashion than Durkheim’s.
One of the main lines of reasoning in Simmel’s lecture is that ‘the money
economy’ enhances independence and autonomy of the person and thus is a
precondition of modern individualism in Durkheim’s sense, but also makes
possible new forms of unity. For example the “enormous successes” of modern
trade unions have been made possible by the neutrality of money that “elimi-
nates everything personal and specific” and unites people impersonally for a
course of action. “Thus when one laments the alienating and separating effect of
monetary transactions, one should not forget” that money “creates an extremely
strong bond among the members of an economic circle”: money always “points
to other individuals,” so that “the modern person is dependent on infinitely
more suppliers and supply sources than was the ancient Germanic freeman or
the later serf.”33 Simmel asserts that money “establishes incomparably more
connections among people than ever existed in the days of feudalism or arbitrary
unification (gewillkürten Einung) that the guild romantics (Associations-Ro-
mantiker) most highly celebrate.”34 Simmel makes quite explicit here whom he
argues against: those who lament alienation, celebrate ancient Germanic or other
village communal life, Associations-Romantiker. Simmel defends here modern
forms of association against Gemeinschaft (community)-style arguments. His
argument differs markedly from the way in which Durkheim for example sought
inspiration from medieval corporations for his proposition to create interme-
diary institutions between state and individual in the concluding chapter of Le
Suicide35 and most famously in the 1902 preface to the second edition of De la
division du travail social.36
33 Simmel, Das Geld in der modernen Kultur (see note 10), p. 182; Simmel, Money in modern
culture (see note 10), p. 246.
34 Simmel, Das Geld in der modernen Kultur (see note 10), p. 183; Simmel, Money in modern
culture (see note 10), p. 246.
35 Emile Durkheim, On Suicide. A Study in Sociology, New York 1997.
36 Emile Durkheim, Preface to the Second Edition. Some Remarks on Professional Groups,
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At the same time, Simmel seems to accept as valid many objections to modern
culture that would also be put forward by romantic Kulturkritik such as that
money produces alienation along with autonomy. Simmel makes a two-pronged
argument: “the conversion of a possession into money” is experienced as a
liberation, as the value of that possession is not anymore “captured in one
particular form” and can subsequently take any arbitrary form, but it also
produces “a vapidity of life and a loosening of its substance.”37 Simmel relates to
this “the restlessness and the dissatisfaction of our times”:
“The qualitative side of objects lose their psychological importance through the money
economy ; the continuously required estimation in terms of monetary value eventually
causes this to seem the only valid one; more and more quickly one lives past the specific
meaning of things that cannot be expressed in economic terms. Its revenge, as it were, is
that dark, so very modern feeling that the core and meaning of life slips through our
fingers again and again, that definite satisfactions become ever rarer, that all the effort
and activity is not actually worthwhile.”38
Equivalence with money devalues even “objects themselves.” Money is common;
only the individual is noble;39 because money is equal to many things, it “pulls
the highest down to the level of the lowest.” Simmel backs up this argument with
a sentence that could be straight out of any kulturpessimistische polemic against
democracy : it is “the tragedy of every levelling process that it leads directly to the
position of the lowest element. For the highest can always descend to the lowest,
but anything low seldom ascends to the highest level.”
The main theoretical point of Simmel’s lecture is that the ever increasing
range of means that lead to more means complicate modern life and push life’s
goals ever further out of sight, culminating in that universal means, money. Due
to its universality and ubiquity, Simmel argues, one “cannot ignore the frequent
lament that money is the God of our times.” This formulation goes back to
Heinrich Heine who added (in the thirty-second dispatch of Lutetia) that
in: Steven Lukes (ed.), Emile Durkheim. The Division of Labor in Society, New York 2014,
p. 8–32.
37 Simmel, Das Geld in der modernen Kultur (see note 10), p. 186; Simmel, Money in Modern
Culture (see note 10), p. 248.
38 “Die qualitative Seite der Objecte büßt durch die Geldwirthschaft an psychologischer Be-
tonung ein, die fortwährend erforderliche Abschätzung nach dem Geldwerthe läßt diesen
schließlich als den einzig gültigen erscheinen, immer rascher lebt man an der spezifischen,
ökonomisch nicht ausdrückbaren Bedeutung der Dinge vorüber, die sich nur durch jene
dumpfen, so sehr modernen Gefühle gleichsam rächt: daß der Kern und Sinn des Lebens uns
immer von neuem aus der Hand gleitet, daß die definitiven Befriedigungen immer seltener
werden, daß das ganze Mühen und Treiben doch eigentlich nicht lohne.”; Simmel, Das Geld
in der modernen Kultur (see note 10), p. 186; Simmel, Money in Modern Culture (see note
10), p. 248–249.
39 Simmel, Das Geld in der modernen Kultur (see note 10), p. 187; Simmel, Money in Modern
Culture (see note 10), p. 249.
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“Rothschild is his prophet.” In Heine, though, this was not a kulturkritischer
‘lament’ but a sarcastic comment on James Rothschild’s conspicuous wealth and
in particular the exaggerated respect paid to him by the ordinary mortals who
visited him in his Paris office.40 Half a century later, in the different context of
Simmel’s day, this much-quoted formulation had indeed become a ‘lament’ and
had acquired a well-established antisemitic subtext, and this seems to be what
Simmel is pointing to.
Simmel explores the homology of money and God in several directions in his
effort to understand what makes it so plausible: God is, according to Nicholas of
Cusa, “the coincidentia oppositorum,” which means that “all the varieties and
contrasts of the world reach unity in Him”; the idea of God and, even more so,
“the idea that we possess Him” creates a rich mixture of feelings of peace and
security, and the “feelings stimulated by money have a psychological similarity
to this in their own arena.” As the “equivalent of all values,” it “becomes the
centre in which the most opposing, alien and distant things find what they have in
common and touch each other.”41 Money, like God, grants “elevation over the
individual” and inspires “trust in its omnipotence.” Like magic, it can conjure up
those lower, particular objects at any given moment by re-metamorphosing into
them:
“This feeling of security and calm which the possession of money provides, this con-
viction of possessing in it the intersection of all values, constitutes psychologically, or,
as it were, formally, the point of comparison that gives the deeper justification to that
complaint about money as the God of our times.”42
Simmel indicates here that in spite of its antisemitic subtext he aims not to
dismiss the kulturkritische ‘lament’ but tries to discover its ‘deeper’ meaning.
Next, Simmel argues that the money economy makes modern life both ab-
stract and petty : it necessitates “continuous mathematical operations in ev-
eryday life,” including the necessity constantly to reduce “qualitative values to
quantitative ones” and a new extent of “exactness, sharpness and precision,” but
also allows to calculate differences in value down to the penny, resulting in a
40 Heinrich Heine, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 4: Schriften zu Literatur und Politik II, Vermischtes,
Munich 1972, p. 250.
41 Simmel, Das Geld in der modernen Kultur (see note 10), p. 192; Simmel, Money in modern
culture (see note 10), p. 252.
42 “Diese Sicherheit und Ruhe, deren Gefühl der Besitz von Geld gewährt, diese Ueberzeugung,
in ihm den Schnittpunkt der Werthe zu besitzen, enthält so rein psychologisch, sozusagen
formal, den Gleichungspunkt, der jener Klage über das Geld als den Gott unserer Zeit die
tiefere Bedeutung giebt.” Simmel, Das Geld in der modernen Kultur (see note 10), p. 192;
Simmel, Money in modern culture (see note 10), p. 252.
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rather petty mentality.43 Likewise, the “fact that people carry around small de-
nominations of money in their pockets” allows them anytime to purchase “all
sorts of small articles, often on a whim,” increasing frivolity and a “petty style” of
life.44 “The objective and indifferent character” with which money “offers itself”
to “the highest and the lowest actions” also induces ethical laxity :
“Persons who are otherwise honest may participate in the most shady kinds of deceitful
‘promotions’, and many people are likely to behave more unconscientiously and with
more dubious ethics in money matters than elsewhere.”45
The use of the term “promotions” (Gründungen) in this passage seems to be a
reference to the discourse on the so-called Gründerschwindel, a staple of the
antisemitic literature of the 1870s in particular, when the economic crisis of 1873
to 1875—dubbed Gründerkrach—was linked to the collapse of risky and
sometimes fraudulent enterprises which in turn were blamed by antisemites on
Jewish involvement.
Simmel concludes his lecture by emphasising that “the money economy” is
internal to and a product of modern culture as a whole:
“The monetary system [is] a branch from the same root that produces all the other
flowers of our culture, [and] one can take consolation from this against the complaints
raised particularly by the preservers of spiritual and emotional values against the auri
sacra fames and the devastation wrought by the financial system. The closer our un-
derstanding comes to that root, the more apparent must become the relations between
the money economy to not only the dark sides but also to the subtlest and highest
aspects of our culture. Thus, like all great historical forces, the money economy might
resemble the mythical spear that is itself capable of healing the wounds it inflicts.”46
Ending on this Rousseauean note, Simmel rules out a rejection of modernity and
the “money economy” that he sees as its defining feature as only modernity can
43 Simmel, Das Geld in der modernen Kultur (see note 10), p. 192; Simmel, Money in modern
culture (see note 10), p. 253.
44 Simmel, Das Geld in der modernen Kultur (see note 10), p. 192; Simmel, Money in modern
culture (see note 10), p. 253.
45 “So haben sich Personen von sonstiger persönlicher Ehrenhaftigkeit an den dunkelsten
‘Gründungen’ betheiligt, und viele Menschen verfahren eher in reinen Geldangelegenheiten
gewissenloser und zweideutiger, als daß sie in anderen Beziehungen sittlich Zweifelhaftes
thäten.”
46 “Das Geldwesen [ist] ein Zweig der gleichen Wurzel, die alle Blüthen unserer Kultur treibt,
[und man mag] daraus einen Trost gegenüber den Klagen schöpfen, die gerade die Pfleger der
geistigen und gemüthlichen Güter über die Auri sacra fames und über die Verwüstungen des
Geldwesens erheben. Denn je mehr die Erkenntniß sich jener Wurzel nähert, desto ersicht-
licher müssen die Beziehungen der Geldwirthschaft, wie zu den Schattenseiten, so doch auch
zu dem Feinsten und Höchsten unserer Kultur hervortreten, so daß es, wie alle großen
geschichtlichen Mächte, dem mythischen Speer gleichen mag, der die Wunden, die er schlägt,
selbst zu heilen im Stande ist.” Simmel, Das Geld in der modernen Kultur (see note 10),
p. 196; Simmel, Money in modern culture (see note 10), p. 254f.
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right modernity’s wrongs. Simmel adds that “the formation of economic life […]
receives its character from the great uniform trends of historical life, whose
ultimate sources and motives in turn are the divine secret (das göttliche
Geheimniß).”47 Although it is important to recognise that Simmel formulates
here an argument against anti-modern Kulturkritik, the rather cheesy meta-
physical ‘consolation’ he offers is unlikely to impress many of those who feel
driven towards it by the uglier sides of modernity and the “money economy.”
Both Simmel and Durkheim similarly try to square the circle of defending
modern society while accepting quite a few of the kulturkritische ‘laments’ about
modernity also shared by antisemites. These include the notion that it is char-
acterised by ‘Spencerian’ egotism, the abstract and soulless mechanics of the
economic, and a ‘sacred’ greed for material wealth all of which they argue need to
be opposed. Durkheim chiefly works with a dichotomy of idealist versus utili-
tarian notions of individualism, Simmel more dialectically argues that the
positive and negative aspects of modernity are inseparably interwoven with each
other. Both suggest, though, that modernity’s sunny side is bound to prevail,
which Simmel suppurts by appealing to a straightforwardly metaphysical notion
of a ‘divine secret’, while Durkheim, in good positivist fashion recoiling from
such open admission of reliance on non-sociological reasoning, suggests that
there are positive, socio-historical reasons why modern society not only needs,
but by necessity also must and will produce the non-egotistical form of in-
dividualism.
Both interventions in their own right are highly instructive and fascinating
when discussed in their respective historical contexts but appear in retrospect as
forms of whistling in the dark, albeit formulated eloquently and in good faith.
Both are equally and in combination, though, part of the intellectual culture that
from a perspective post-Holocaust must be said to have failed. No other per-
spective is available, though: we are condemned to working within and with the
debris of the civilization that brought about and was undone, but not terminated,
by the Holocaust. History has made historicism irrelevant: we do not have the
luxury of taking our viewpoint from anywhere other than a dismal and dis-
illusioned present. Social theory must deal seriously and robustly with reac-
tionary critiques of modern capitalist civilization, including its own blind spots
and ambiguities lest it be, at best, ineffective in the struggle against, at worst,
recuperated by, the enemy. The right-wing critique of civilization can only be
defeated through a critique of the civilization modern humans have created that
turns its emancipatory promises against its failure to deliver them. As in the texts
by Durkheim and Simmel discussed in this chapter, critical study of classical
47 Simmel, Das Geld in der modernen Kultur (see note 10), p. 196; Simmel, Money in modern
culture (see note 10), p. 254f.
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sociological theory can discover elements of such critique as well as the limits of a
(post-) Enlightenment that was cut short.48
48 I am taking my cue here from the position developed by Horkheimer and Adorno, most
eminently in their 1947 book, Dialectic of Enlightenment. On this see Marcel Stoetzler, ‘It only
needs all’: re-reading Dialectic of Enlightenment at 70, openDemocracy (June 24, 2017), URL:
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/marcel-stoetzler/it-only-needs-all-
re-reading-dialectic-of-enlightenment-at-70> (last access April 28, 2018); ‘Dialectic of En-
lightenment. Philosophical Fragments’, in: Beverly Best/Werner Bonefeld/Chris O’Kane
(eds.), 2018, The SAGE Handbook of Frankfurt School Critial Theory, vol. 1, 142–160 and
‘Wer aber von der Geschichte des Subjekts nicht reden will, sollte auch vom Kapitalismus
schweigen. Zur Radikalität der Dialektik der Aufklärung’, in: Gunzelin Schmid Noerr/Eva-
Maria Ziege, eds., 70 Jahre Dialektik der Aufklärung, Springer (in press).
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